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AbstrAct: This paper sought to discuss the role of the armed For-
ces in Public Security, shedding light mainly on two points: the 
increased number of military crimes, especially those under law nº 
13.4891/17, and the maintenance of jurisdiction in military courts 
over conflicting parties involved in lawsuits of Law and Order As-
surance nature. Therefore, an exploratory and qualitative research 
was developed based on national and international doctrine and 
jurisprudence, as well as on the Brazilian legislation. This enabled 
us to acknowledge that the way and the extent to which the armed 
Forces have been employed in Public Safety and in the Brazilian 
criminal prosecution may result in great risks of damage to human 
rights and, hence, to democracy.
Key words: armed Forces; Public Security; Military Crimes; Juris-
diction to try.
resumo: O artigo buscou discutir a atuação das Forças Armadas na Segurança 
Pública, lançando luz principalmente sobre dois pontos: o aumento no rol 
de crimes militares, especialmente no que diz respeito à Lei 13.4891/17, 
e a manutenção em tribunais militares com jurisdicionalidade sobre civis 
conflitados em ações de Garantia da Lei e da Ordem (GLO). Para tanto, 
foi desenvolvida pesquisa exploratória e qualitativa, a partir da doutrina 
e jurisprudência nacional e internacional e da legislação brasileira. Com 
isso, foi possível reconhecer que na forma e na regularidade em que se tem 
empregado as Forças Armadas na Segurança Pública e na persecução penal 
brasileira há grande risco de lesão aos direitos humanos e, assim, à democracia.
PAlAvrAs-chAve: Forças Armadas; Segurança Pública; Crimes militares; 
Competência para julgamento.
contents: Introduction; 1. Criticism on Police Work in Public Safety; 
2. Agents of The Armed Forces, the Military Staff; 3. Operations 
of Law and Order (LAO); 4. Militarization of Public Security and 
Human rights; Conclusion; references.
IntroductIon
The Brazilian Armed Forces have been increasingly used to 
assure the National Public Security. Only in the 2010’s, a presidential 
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decree created about 50 law-and-order operations, which should be 
exceptional but became a palliative strategy for continuing problems in 
the federation units4. 
Besides the criticism on the preparation of service members to 
act in direct contact with civilians on the streets, in times of peace, the 
army’s performance in conflicts of public security has generated discus-
sions about the limits of the military penal code and the jurisdiction of 
the military justice towards civilians, and thus considering the safeguard 
of human rights and democracy. 
Thus, the role of the Army as a Public Security agent has to be 
investigated to throw light on two issues related to criminal prosecution 
by military agencies. One problem consists of an increased number of 
military felonies, especially due to changes in legislation for crimes com-
mitted by service members against life in the context of law-and-order 
(LAO) operations. Moreover, the other comprises the maintenance of 
military courts with jurisdiction over civilians with military personnel 
in policing actions of the Armed Forces in peacetime. 
In doing so, we developed an exploratory and qualitative re-
search based on documents from secondary sources of national and 
international legal writings and case law, and from primary sources of 
Brazilian legislation.
1. crItIcIsm on PolIce Work In PublIc safety
For some time, public security has occupied a central space 
in political debates, following different approaches according with the 
existing decision-making institutions5. Above all, in late modernity, the 
fear of crime and terrorism has been demanding solutions that are more 
effective, which is well represented by a constant vigilance6. 
4 MINISTÉRIO DA DEFESA. DISTRIBUIÇAO DAS OPERAÇÕES DE GLO 1992 
- 2018.
5 FABRETTI, Humberto Barrinuevo. Políticas de segurança Pública: questio-
namentos preliminares. In: SMANIO, Gianpaolo Poggio; BERTOLIN, Patrícia 
Tuma Martins; BRASIL, Patrícia Cristina (Orgs.). O Direito na Fronteira das 
Políticas Públicas. Páginas&Letras, 2015, p.23.
6 BAUMAN, Zygmunt. Vigilância Líquida. Jorge Zahar. 2013, passim.
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Within this context, questions, controversies, and conflicts re-
garding public security actions and institutions increase concomitantly, 
especially those related to policing and police authority7. Police can be 
understood as a military or civil institution that has an organized person-
nel body with obligations, including the crime control and public order 
maintenance, even if physical force must be used8. These obligations 
were authorized by the society and respective governments and were 
applied to these people9. 
The Brazilian military police model dates back from the arrival 
of the Second Line of auxiliary troops, in the Lisbon standards10. The 
police structure has two forces, one civil and another military, a model 
that has persisted more clearly since the arrival of the Royal Family11. 
The policing mandate can be understood as “the exercise of coercive 
power legitimately and legally backed by the force”12. The police power 
7 LEMES, Thiago Morais de Almeida e GARRIDO, Rodrigo Grazinoli. Trans-
formações das instituições de segurança pùblica brasileira e seus reflexos no 
reconhecimento do mandato e na accountability. Revista Direito & Paz. v. 1, n. 
36, 2017, p.218.
8 BITTNER, Egon. The Functions of Police in Modern Society. A Review of Back-
ground Factors, Current Practices, and Posible Role Models. New York. Janson 
Aronson, 1975, passim.
9 BAYLEY, David Hume. Comparando a Organização das Polícias em Países 
de Língua Inglesa. In:  Tonry, Michael & Morris, Norval (eds). Policiamento 
Moderno. São Paulo, Editora USP, 2003, p. 539. CARRABINE, Eamonn; COX, 
Pam; LEE, Maggy; PLUMMER, Ken. e SOUTH, Nigel. Criminology: A Socio-
logical Introduction. Routledge, 2009, p.338. MUNIZ, Jaqueline de Oliveira. e 
PROENÇA Jr. D. Da Accountability Seletiva à Plena Responsabilidade Policial. 
In: CRUSO, Haydée; MUNIZ, Jaqueline e CARBALLO e BLANCO, Antônio 
Carlos Carballo (Org.). Polícia, Estado e Sociedade: Saberes e Práticas Latino-a-
mericanos. 1 ed. Rio de Janeiro: Publit Seleções Editoriais, 2007, v. 1, p. 25.
10 COMISSÃO DA VERDADE – ESTADO DE SÃO PAULO. Relatório. Tomo 1, 
Parte 1 - estruturas e sistemas da repressão. A militarização da segurança 
pública. 2015. 
11 For more information about structure and history of Brazilian Police Insti-
tutions, see: LEMES, Thiago Morais de Almeida e GARRIDO, Rodrigo Gra-
zinoli. Transformações das instituições de segurançapública brasileira e seus 
reflexos no reconhecimento do mandato e na accountability. Revista Direito & 
Paz. v. 1, n. 36, 2017
12 Ibdem, p.38. 
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as defined by the National Tax Code (Law nº 5172/1966) should not be 
thwarted, but it can be interpreted from the following wording: 
Art. 78. The police power is deemed as a public administration 
activity that, limiting or disciplining right, interest or freedom, 
regulates the practice of an act or abstention of a fact, by virtue of 
public interest related to safety, hygiene, order, customs, discipline 
of production and market, the exercise of economic activities 
which are dependent upon concession or authorization by the 
Public Power for public peace or for the respect for property and 
individual or collective rights. 
Certainly, the policing mandate not always was developed to 
serve the citizen but, above all, towards the fulfillment of specific po-
litical interests13 That way, even in a democratic society, tensions and 
contradictions remain to be solved in this action. 
Also, democratic and citizen actions should not be confused with 
neglect of the use of force, but rather the qualitative differences between 
force and violence must be underscored. Police action is fundamentally 
based on the use of force, within legality and legitimacy14. Thus, the 
policing mandate has to be an instrument of conflict management and 
coercion limited by legislation and social legitimacy. 
Lastly, among the apparent contradictions of democratic police 
action are the limits of discretion. Police action should not be restricted 
as discretion is required to act differently in each case, demanding im-
mediate and emergency decisions15. As a result, the police will always be 
like a “glass” waiting for the “stones” to be shattered. This subtle irony 
13 LEMES, Thiago Morais de Almeida e GARRIDO, Rodrigo Grazinoli. Trans-
formações das instituições de segurança pùblica brasileira e seus reflexos no 
reconhecimento do mandato e na accountability. Revista Direito & Paz. v. 1, n. 
36, 2017, p. 228. 
14 MUNIZ, Jaqueline de Oliveira. e PROENÇA Jr. D. Da Accountability Seleti-
va à Plena Responsabilidade Policial. In: CRUSO, Haydée; MUNIZ, Jaqueline 
e CARBALLO e BLANCO, Antônio Carlos Carballo (Org.). Polícia, Estado e 
Sociedade: Saberes e Práticas Latino-americanos. 1 ed. Rio de Janeiro: Publit 
Seleções Editoriais, 2007, v. 1, passim.
15 Ibdem, p.41.
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was well established by Marx16: “the police become both the main support 
and the main threat to a democratic society”. 
The training of Brazilian police officers is by far still part of a 
repressive proposal, based on criminal punitivism, militarism, and under 
a dogmatic vision typical of bachelorism17,18,19,20,21. 
Kant de Lima points out that this training, focused on obedience 
to the rigid canons of law and hierarchy relations between positions, 
reveals to be: 
[...]distanced from the essential for a good performance of police 
functions, which consists of making real-time, autonomous, and 
independent decisions subjected to further liability, which include 
an unpredictable variety of issues that are delivered.22. 
This lack of preparation for reality often leads the officers to 
go beyond the limits of law on behalf of “defense of public order” for 
believing in a clear division between citizens and enemies of society23. 
According to Rodrigues, the military police training is based on a model 
16 MARX, Gary T. Police and Democracy. In: Amir, M e Einstein, S. (eds.) Poli-
cing, Security and Democracy: Theory and Practice, vol. 2. Office of Internatio-
nal Criminal Justice. 2001. online.
17 BUARQUE DE HOLANDA, Sergio. Raízes do Brasil. 26ª ed. São Paulo: Com-
panhia das Letras, 1995. p.156.
18 KANT de LIMA, Roberto. Entre as leis e as normas: Éticas corporativas e 
práticas profissionais na segurança pública e na Justiça Criminal. DILEMAS. 
Vol. 6 - n 4, 2, 2013, p. 564.
19 RODRIGUES, R The Dilemmas of Pacification: News of War and Peace in the 
‘Marvelous City’. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 
3(1): 22, 2014, passim. 
20 FRANÇA, F.G. Pensar ou Obedecer? - Desafio da educação em direitos huma-
nos para os policiais militares. Revista Interdisciplinar de Direitso Humanos. 
V.4, n.1, 2016, p.75,
21 MUNIZ, Jaqueline de Oliveira. A Crise de Identidade das Polícia Militares 
Brasileiras: Dilemas e Paradoxos da Formação Educacional. Security and De-
fense Studies Review. V. 1, 2001, p.186.
22 Idem 18. 
23 KANT de LIMA, Roberto. Ensaios de antropologia e de direito: Acesso à justiça e 
processos institucionais de administração de conflitos e produção da verdade jurí-
dica em uma perspectiva comparada. Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris. 2011. 289p.
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which reflects that “the development of individual leadership in a dialogic 
scenario that would be necessary for peace is not prioritized.”24
Indeed, this way of acting, which has historical roots, served the 
political interests of governments and was legitimized by a large part of 
the population, and persists as a form of social and crime control25.. De 
Lima, citing other authors, made it even clearer in a passage that deserves 
to be quoted: 
[...] the persistence of police violence, for instance, could be partly 
linked to the popular support given to police actions, demons-
trating a cultural pattern widespread, which legitimizes the use 
violence by authorities. As police behavior appears to be in line 
with acceptable standards for most people, there would be some 
reluctance to support attempts at change towards the strengthening 
of the rule of law and respect for individual rights26. 
Such modus operandi can be well explained by the data from the 
11th Brazilian Public Safety Yearbook27, wherein it is stated that between 
2009 and 2016, there were 21,897 deaths during police operations. Ac-
cording to data from 2016, this situation brings fear to the majority of 
population to be victims of such violence, by either the Military Police 
(59%) or the Civil Police (53%). Overall, 70% of the population believes 
that police officers overuse power. The recognition of the mandate is also 
related to the death of police officers. Brazilian police officers died 113% 
more on duty than did American police officers between 2009 and 2015; 
in 2016 alone, 437 police officers were murdered.28 
Now, if even constitutional agents of public security (federal, 
civil and military police officers and military firefighters) are harshly 
24 Ibdem 19, p 10.
25 Idem 23.
26 LIMA, João Marcelo Maciel. Democracia e accountability: mecanismos de 
controle externo na polícia militar do estado de São Paulo (1989-2007). AU-
RORA. II(3), p. 56-69, 2008, p. 59.
27 FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA. 11º Anuário Brasileiro de 
Segurança Pública. 2017. p. 107.
28 FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA. 10º Anuário Brasileiro de 
Segurança Pública. 2016, p. 6.
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criticized, despite their problems in professional training and perfor-
mance, and instructions of acting in public safety as the first mission, 
what can we say about the performance of Armed Forces agents in this 
context? For these, the mission of public security, by the assurance of 
law and order, is only secondary29.
2. agents of the armed forces, the mIlItary staff
According to the definition found in the Aurélio Portuguese Dic-
tionary, a military officer is someone who is taking part of “the Army’s 
career”, participating in “wars”, “battles”, among others.
In turn, the Military Penal Code brings a legal concept for it in 
its article 22, adding that “a serviceperson is [...] anyone who, in time 
of peace or war, is incorporated into the Armed Forces to serve in all 
ranks and grades, or subjection to military discipline”. While the article 
142 of the Federal Constitution, specifically at § 3, determines that “the 
members of the Armed Forces are military officers”.
Nevertheless, as regards to Public Security, article 14430 of the 
Federal Constitution brings the figure of Military Police and Fire Brigade, 
which, in turn, are incorporated into the Armed Forces only in case of 
declared war, to be the so-called Auxiliary Forces and reservations of 
the Army31, also divided into ranks and grades. In this way, the Brazilian 
Military Forces comprise the Armed Forces along with the State Military 
Police and Fire Brigade.
That being said, military officers are intended to serve the na-
tion, through federal or state agencies, being a special civil servant (i.e., 
29 Art. 142 c/c art.144, C.F e Lei Complementar nº 117/2004.
30 C.F. art. 144 Public security, the duty of the State, the right and responsibility 
of all, is exercised for the preservation of public order and the security of per-
sons and property, through the following organs: I - federal police; II - federal 
highway police; III - federal railway police; IV - civil police; V - military police 
and military fire brigades.
31 C.F. art. 142 The Armed Forces, consisting of the Navy, the Army and the 
Aeronautics, are permanent and regular national institutions, organized on 
the basis of hierarchy and discipline, under the supreme authority of the Pre-
sident of the Republic, and are designed to defend The guarantee of constitu-
tional powers and, on the initiative of any of them, of law and order. 
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military servant) who, in turn, owns a special status, as in the article 3 
of the Law nº 6880/80 of the Military Statute. In litteris: “Due to their 
constitutional destination, the members of the Armed Forces are part of 
a special category of Homeland Servants, being named military officers.”
About this definition, the honorable Gasparini32 provided an 
explanation of the term ‘agents’, “stating that military agents are all per-
sons who, permanently or temporarily, perform military activity at the 
federal or state level, earning a subsidy”. 
These agents, of both genders, enter the Military Forces through 
an open call for tender (military career) or by volunteering (summoned, 
reinstated, designated, or mobilized reserve component), military trai-
ning students from active- and reserve-duty personnel, every Brazilian 
citizen mobilized for service in time of war, and people from compulsory 
military service (recruitment), which occurs through the provision of 
initial military service33.
In turn, it is important to emphasize that the military officers have 
unique duties and obligations, such as the sacrifice of their own life34. They 
also have rights, prerogatives and obligations assigned them according to their 
functions within the military hierarchy, whose division is based on ranks 
and grades or for being (or not) in active service for the Military Forces. 
Rank is the hierarchical level of an officer, which is conferred by 
the President of the Republic for the Armed Forces35 and by the Governor 
32 GASPARINI, Diogenes. Direito Administrativo. 17ª ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 
2012. p.309. 
33 Army recruitment is mandatory only for males above 18 years old, or for 
those who have a higher education degree of interest in the military admi-
nistration (medical, veterinary, pharmacy, and nursing professionals). These 
people got rid of compulsory service at enrollment for being during acade-
mic formation, to do so later within their respective field of expertise. 
34 Lei nº 6.880/1980. art. 27. Art. 27. There are essential manifestations of the 
military value: I - patriotism, translated by the unwavering will to perform 
military duty and by the solemn oath of fidelity to the Motherland even with 
the sacrifice of one’s life; II - civility and the cult of historical traditions; III - 
faith in the high mission of the Armed Forces; IV - the spirit of body, pride of 
the military by the organization where it serves; V - the love of the profession 
of arms and the enthusiasm with which it is exercised; and VI - the technical 
and professional improvement.
35 C.F. art. 142 § 3º I.
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of the respective member state and Federal District for the Military Police 
and Fire Brigade36. Yet the grade is the hierarchical degree of the military 
base, which is vested by a competent military authority37. 
Concerning the military activity or inactivity, the active military 
is known, by law, to be the person who is serving the Armed Forces or 
the State Military Forces, as well as those of the Federal District, ready 
to fulfill their constitutional functions and being in continuous activity 
and entirely devoted to the Military Forces. In the § 1 of the article 3, 
from the Military Statute, it is foreseen that active military people may be:
I - professional soldier; II - incorporated soldier to provide ini-
tial military service during periods foreseen by legislation or 
extensions; III - members of the Armed Forces Reserve when 
summoned, reinstated, designated or mobilized; IV - students of a 
military training body of active- and reserve-duty personnel; and 
V - in time of war, every Brazilian citizen mobilized for service 
in the Armed Forces. 
Next comes the figure of an inactive military person, who is in 
remunerated reserve, retired or in both categories, exceptionally (fulfilling 
task for a certain time after reservation), as stated in paragraph “b” of § 
1 of the article 3, from the Military Statute, as follows: 
b) In inactive status: 
I - Agents in a remunerated reserve belonging to the Armed Forces 
and receiving remuneration from the Union, but still subject to 
the provision of service on active duty, upon summons or mobi-
lization; and II - retired persons that, when had undergone one of 
the above situations, are permanently exempted from active duty, 
but continue to receive remuneration from the Union. 
In addition, those who are considered military officers are required 
dedication and continuous improvement through continuous and entirely 
devoted activity in favor of the primary purposes of the Military Forces, 
as well as intellectual capacity, physical ability, and moral reputation. 
36 C.F. art 144 § 6º.
37 Lei nº 6.880/1980, art 16 § 3º. 
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3. oPeratIons of laW and order (lao)
As taught by Agra38, the Armed Forces, composed of the Brazilian 
Navy, Army, and Air Force, “are the contingent of men whose primary pre-
rogative is the Nation’s defense, noting that these three forces have relative 
autonomy, following the guidelines formulated by the Ministry of Defense”. 
The Federal Constitution, in turn, besides conferring the task 
of defending the country on the Armed Forces, it establishes their res-
ponsibilities, specifically in the article 142, such as “the guarantee of 
constitutional powers and, by the initiative of any of these, of the law 
and order”. Therefore, besides being based on principles, as will be seen 
from now on, the Armed Forces have attributions both in an external 
and internal sphere of our territorial delineations. 
Abroad, the Armed Forces were given responsibility of maintai-
ning the National Security and Sovereignty, ensuring the defense against 
threats from other States, as guardian of the Brazilian territory. In the 
National Defense field, the Armed Forces are supposed to protect the Bra-
zilian population and look after national interests, protecting the country 
against any kind of threat that may harm its sovereignty. Furthermore, 
Hely Lopes Meirelles39 emphasizes that “National Security is an integral 
and permanent surveillance of the State over its territory, safeguarding 
the people, its political regime and institutions”. 
On the other hand, within a national scope, on continuance and 
regularity matters, “the forces are permanently disposed since they are 
linked to the very existence of the State, and cannot be dissolved for 
functioning continuously”40. Thus, the Armed Forces will also be in charge 
of ensuring the constitutional powers, when requested, and mainly by 
means of request, interventions would occur, but in due course of time 
in very special situations41. 
38 AGRA, Walber de Moura. Curso de Direito Constitucional. 8ª ed. Rio de Ja-
neiro: Forense, 2014. p. 775.
39 MEIRELLES, Hely Lopes. Direito Administrativo Brasileiro. 25ª Edição. São 
Paulo: Malheiros, 1996.
40 AGRA, Walber de Moura. Curso de Direito Constitucional. 8ª ed. Rio de 
Janeiro: Forense, 2014. p. 775.
41 C.F. art. 142.
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This competence, called the Law and Order Operation (LAO), 
is signed in a subsidiary and interventional action, initiated by the Pre-
sident of the Republic or in response to a request made by any of the 
constitutional powers, through the Presidents of the Supreme Federal 
Court, the Federal Senate, or the House of Representatives. 
This is not a recent action, it could have been seen more or less 
clearly since the constitution of 182442. However, since the Constitution 
of 1988, it became more explicit especially in the assumptions expressed 
in articles 34 (Federal Intervention), 136 (State of National Defense), 
and 137 (State of Siege), as well as in the article 15 of Complementary 
Law nº 97/99.
In the first assumptions (federal intervention; state of defense; 
state of siege), there is a direct interference with the exercise of funda-
mental rights and autonomy by Federation Units. In the other three, the 
same is not true. Specifically, in nationally relevant events, the role of the 
Armed Forces in Public Security is regulated by the article 5, sole para-
graph of Decree nº 3,897/01, wherein the military officers “are entrusted 
to network with local authorities”. In addition, the role in policing work 
requested by the State Governor is regulated by the Complementary Law 
nº 97/99, with wording modified by the Complementary Law nº 117/2004. 
In spite of the lack of exceptions, to fulfill the demands for the 
action of the Armed Forces in Public Security, all the instruments for the 
preservation of the public order and the safety of people and property 
must be exhausted, or being unable to be employed. However, such joint 
action with military forces, instead of being occasional and of short du-
ration, has been reiterated and for an indefinite period. 
According to Barroso43, the most common ways of joining the 
Union and the states for the action of the Armed Forces have not been 
42 LIMA e SILVA, Gualterberg Nogueira e SCHWARTZ, Germano André Doe-
derlein. Espaço urbano e cultura do medo: o uso das forças em atividade de 
polícia. Reflexão dogmática sobre a pacificação nas comunidades brasileiras. 
In: SANTOS, Bartira Macedo Miranda; RIBEIRO, Luiz Gustavo Gonçalves e 
De MELLO, Marilia Montenegro Pessoa. Criminologias e política criminal. Flo-
rianópolis: CONPEDI. 2015. p. 347.
43 BARROSO, Luís. Roberto. Segurança pública: atuação das Forças Armadas 
tem de ser excepcional. Consultor Jurídico, 26 jun. 2008. 
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through agreements. This is, however, a means of regulating short-term 
actions used, for example, in stoppages by Military Police staff in Tocan-
tins, Alagoas, Minas Gerais, Paraíba, Pernambuco and, more recently, 
Espírito Santo states. 
Therefore, only in the 2010 decade, still underway, the Presi-
dency of the Republic decreed LAO operations almost 30 times, which 
cost R$ 1.4 billion. By comparison, between 2011 and 2015, presidential 
expenses with the National Public Security Secretariat did not exceed 
R$ 49.9 million44. 
For Machado45, the political choice to militarize public security 
has become quite evident in recent years. This author also reports that, 
only in 2017, the following LAO operations were decreed:
Rio de Janeiro (July 28 to December 31, 2017), Federal District 
(Esplanade of Ministries; May 24 to 25, 2017), Espírito Santo (Fe-
bruary 6 to March 8, 2017), Greater Rio de Janeiro (February 14 to 
22, 2017), Espírito Santo (February 6 to 16, 2017), Greater Natal 
(January 20 to February 4, 2017), and throughout the entire Bra-
zilian Prison System (from January 17, 2017 to January 17, 2018).
In the last days of December 2017, the government enacted 
another LAO operation; sending two thousand men from the Armed 
Forces to Rio Grande do Norte, initially for a fortnight46. This operation 
was due to a strike by the state police officers over unpaid wages and 
poor work conditions.
Of course, public safety is everyone’s right and state’s respon-
sibility, being embodied by the exercise of police power involving any 
action for public safety (article 144 of the Federal Constitution). However, 
among the public agencies responsible for public safety would be the Po-
lice, whether Federal Police, Federal Highway or Federal Railway Patrols, 
44 CABALLERO, M. Diagnóstico Reação em Vez de Prevenção. A Guerra do Bra-
sil. Jornal O Globo. 14 de dezembro de 2017, p. 8.
45 MACHADO, Leonardo Marcondes. Lei 13.491/17 e a militarização da segu-
rança pública. In: FONTES, Eduardo e HOFFMANN, Henrique. Temas avan-
çados de polícia judiciária. Salvador: JusPodium. 2018, passim.
46 Decreto de 29 de dezembro de 2017.
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as well as Civil and Military Police, of the responsibility of each state of 
the Federation, in addition to the Fire Brigade, which are all, intended to 
preserve or restore public order, and population property and well-being. 
First of all, the Armed Forces are clearly not part of any body 
whose attribution is the exercise of activities related to public security, 
not least since there is an own chapter in the Federal Constitution about 
it. Thus, given its nature and constitutional mission, the Armed Forces 
can only be involved in public security in cases of article 15 of Comple-
mentary Law nº 97/99, when they would take the lead in public security 
bodies and work to restore order, as well as federal intervention in the 
member states of the Federation47. 
Notably, the intervention cited in the Complementary Law No. 
97 of June 9, 1999, which was later amended by the Complementary 
Law No. 117 of September 2, 2004, provides for general rules for orga-
nization, preparation, and employment of the Armed Forces, explaining 
in the article 15 under which conditions the Armed Forces are to act to 
guarantee law and order48. 
47 FELIZARDO, Marília do Amaral e Do AMARAL, Vilma Aparecida. Da atua-
ção das forças armadas na segurança pública dos estados-membros. Revista 
de Direito Público, V, 4, N. 2, 2009, p.79.
48 Art. 15. The Federal President shall be responsible for engaging the Armed 
Forces in the country’s defense and for constitutional guarantees of power 
in the participation of law and order and peace operations. The President 
directs the State Minister of Defense, who shall activate the operational 
bodies, as the following hierarchy: I - directly to the Supreme Commander, 
in the case of Combined Commands, composed by means adjudicated by 
the Armed Forces and, when necessary, by other organs; II - directly to the 
State Minister of Defense, for training purposes, in combined operations, 
or when it is considered the Brazilian participation in peace operations; III 
- directly to the respective Force Commander, respecting the superior di-
rection of the State Minister of Defense, in the case of isolated employment 
of means of a single Force. 
 § 1º The President of the Republic shall decide whether to use the Armed 
Forces, on his own initiative or in response to requests from the Presidents 
of Federal Supreme Court, Federal Senate, or House of Representatives. The 
President directs the State Minister of Defense, who shall activate the opera-
tional bodies, as the following hierarchy: 
 §2o To ensure law and order, the Armed Forces, at the initiative of any of 
the constitutional powers, shall act as the guidelines issued in the act of 
the Federal President, after depleting the instruments for preservation of 
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Currently, the law has not been reliably observed. Over time, 
although the Armed Forces have been used in situations that have already 
reached a high degree of conflict, there has been a glimpse of trivialization 
of military employment, repeatedly, for unlimited time, often as a way 
increase the scarce contingent of state police. 
In this regard, we can first cite the support given to political 
events such as ECO-92 in 199249; OPERAÇÃO RIO II in 1995; municipal 
or national elections50; and to sporting events such as the Confederations 
Cup and the World Cup, both in 201451; in addition to the Olympic Games 
hosted in Brazil in 201652. 
In the so-called “occupations”, such as those that took place in 
Rio de Janeiro at different times, like in Mangueira and Dendê slums in 
1994, Rocinha in 2011, Complexo do Alemão in 2010, and Complexo da 
Maré in 2014, the Armed Forces were used as a state’s response to its 
own ineffectiveness in tackling crime, which reached alarming levels. 
The latest cases of use of the Armed Forces outside of the cons-
titutional scope have occurred in support of prisons. Only in the first 
quarter of 2017, several prisoner rebellions culminated in the death of 
public order and people property and well-being listed in article 144 of the 
Federal Constitution. 
 §3o The instruments listed in the article 144, Federal Constitution, are con-
sidered exhausted when, at a given moment, they are formally recognized by 
the respective Federal or State Executive Chief as unavailable, inexistent or 
insufficient to the regular performance of a constitutional mission. 
 §4o If fulfilled the conditions in § 3o of this article, after message of the Fe-
deral President, operational bodies of the Armed Forces will be activated, 
which will develop, at times in a previously established area and for a limited 
time, preventive and repressive actions required to ensure the result of law 
and order operations. 
 §5o Once the Armed Forces are designated for law and order operations, the 
competent authorities should transfer, through a formal act, the operational 
control of public security bodies to the new authority in charge; so coordina-
tion centers for operations are formed, being composed of representatives of 
public bodies, under its operational control or with related interests.
49 Lei Complementar n° 69/1991.
50 Lei nº 4.737/1965, art- 23, XIV.
51 Lei nº 12.663/2012.
52 Decreto de 24 de agosto de 2016.
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dozens of inmates in different states of the Federation, such as Amazonas, 
Roraima, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Norte. 
It is unambiguously that the use of the Armed Forces has become 
a recurrent and trivial tool, which does not tackle the root of the problem, 
but presents a fast and media solution, using the population confidence 
as sedative against problems with the growing criminality and wishes for 
effective responses by the State. 
The ordinary use of the Armed Forces denotes the lack of in-
vestments in public security and politicizing the issue. Thus, such a 
choice demonstrates that there is no intent of improvements to assure 
social peace, increasing the Union’s interference with states’ affairs and 
threatening the federative pact. 
4. mIlItarIzatIon of PublIc securIty and human rIghts
The use of Armed Forces in Public Security should occur only 
in exceptional situations, because when enforcement of these agents is 
reiterated in the form of Complementary Law No. 117/2004, it is possible 
to endanger the entire State framework.
Felizardo and Do Amararal point out the following consequences 
of this action:
[...] weakening of the democratic rule of law; disharmony among 
the three government branches; imbalance of the federative pact; 
state of chaos; disintegration of the fundamental rights; and small 
share of the Public Security organs already responsible for the 
safety of Member States53. 
It should be clear that the constitutional use of the Armed Forces 
is not being discussed here, but rather the suitability and preparation 
of agents. According to Flavia Piovesan, prior to take any measure, it is 
needed to “respect the legal principles of reasonableness, proportionality, 
53 FELIZARDO, Marília do Amaral e Do AMARAL, Vilma Aparecida. Da atua-
ção das forças armadas na segurança pública dos estados-membros. Revista 
de Direito Público, V, 4, N. 2, 2009, p. 79.
1265https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v4i3.167 |
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, vol. 4, n. 3, p. 1249-1274, set.-dez. 2018.
and necessity to avoid that any federal decree or intervention provides 
the possibility of a State acting under principles of authoritarianism”54.
Therefore, the confrontational and territorial domination politics 
have been worsened with clear perspective of militarization, where a 
criminal is the enemy, instead of encouraging a criminal investigation55. 
In general, these authors consider that “[...] the use of unprepared or 
malformed military forces can seriously jeopardize the rights to demo-
cracy, freedom, and life”56. The death of three young people in Morro 
da Providência (Rio de Janeiro) in 2008, during a military action, is an 
example of this57.
The recurrence of LAO operations led to submission and approval 
of an amendment of the Military Penal Code58. A representative of the 
Liberal Party (PL), Mr. Esperidião Amin, presented the law project to the 
House of Representatives and Senate. It empowered the Union Military 
Justice to judge intentional crimes against the life of soldiers involved 
in these operations against civilians if under the following conditions:
I – the fulfillment of duties as established by the President or the 
State Minister of Defense; 
II – action involving the security of a military institution or mission, 
even if non-belligerent; or 
III – activities of military nature, peace operations, law and or-
der assurance or subsidiary attribution, which are performed in 
accordance with provisions stated in article 142 of the Federal 
54 PIOVESAN, Flávia. apud De LIMA e SILVA, Gualterberg Nogueira e SCH-
WARTZ, Germano André Doederlein. Espaço urbano e cultura do medo: o 
uso das forças em atividade de polícia. Reflexão dogmática sobre a pacifica-
ção nas comunidades brasileiras. In: SANTOS, Bartira Macedo Miranda; RI-
BEIRO, Luiz Gustavo Gonçalves e De MELLO, Marilia Montenegro Pessoa. 
Criminologias e política criminal. Florianópolis: CONPEDI. 2015. p. 352. 
55 FELIZARDO, Marília do Amaral e Do AMARAL, Vilma Aparecida. Revista de 
Direito Público, V, 4, N. 2, 2009, p. 92.
56 Ibdem, p. 94.
57 G1. Especialista teme que morte de jovens da Providência fique impune. 
58 PLC 44/2016 (PL 5768/2016). Justification [...] It should be noted that the 
Armed Forces are increasingly presente in the national scene acting close to 
society, especially in operations to guarantee the law and order. [...] 
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Constitution, and other information required by the following 
law codes: 
a) Brazilian Air Force Code; 
b) Complementary Law nº 97, of June 9, 1999; 
c) Military Code of Criminal Procedure; and 
d) Electoral Code.
Several politicians and public security professionals commented 
on complementary law project (PLC 44/2016) in O Dia newspaper59. 
The Senate Rapporteur, Senator Pedro Chaves, considered that, while in 
military action, these agents are the State itself, and it is impossible to 
judge them as regular citizens. Yet Senator Romario, who voted in favor 
of the project, considered that the Armed Forces have been increasingly 
used in such operations, so the Military Justice would be a more specia-
lized body with specific knowledge for this kind of trials. The lawyer, 
Marcelo Knopfelmacher, acknowledged that the new legislation would 
bring greater security to the Armed Forces. In addition, Paulo Storani, 
former Captain of the PMRJ (Rio de Janeiro’s Military Police), stressed 
that the Military Justice will never be corporatist, but on the contrary, it 
is much more rigid than is ordinary justice60.
A contrary view was highlighted by Ignácio Cano, a professor 
at UFRJ (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro), who considered it a con-
tradiction the jurisdiction of military soldiers from the Public Security, 
such as state and district police forces, but judging them by another 
court61. The lawyer, João Tancredo, considered this measure a great step 
backwards, besides stating that this type of exception has already been 
proven to be unsuccessful in the military dictatorship62. The human 
rights advisor of Amnesty International Brazil, Renata Neder, believes 
that this legislation will encourage practices of extrajudicial executions, 
59 SANTANA, Matheus. Militar julgar militar: especialistas veem risco de corpo-
rativismo. O Dia de 15 de outubro de 2017. 
60 Idem.
61 Idem.
62 Idem.
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as the actions of the Armed Forces in Public Security have historically 
violated the Human Rights63. Amnesty International has launched an 
urgent campaign “VETA TEMER: crimes against life must be tried in 
civilian courts, prevent such setback!”64.
Whether by the lack of legal warranties or unsuitableness, even 
the Army personnel feel uncomfortable participating in LAO operations. 
The Commander of the Land Forces, General Eduardo Villas-Boas, made 
this clear in a public hearing at the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions and Defense. At this time, the Commander criticized part of the 
population that demands military intervention to solve political crises65. 
Despite the diverse opinions, which could lead to further discus-
sions, on October 13 of 2017, President Temer sanctioned the Law nº 
13491/17, with the amendments to the Military Penal Code, as proposed 
by the PLC 44/2016.
It should be borne in mind that, if for some changes in military 
criminal legislation would give legal security for soldiers employed in 
public security operations, the continuous use of the Armed Forces as 
police outside the barracks gives rise to a myriad of new situations of 
conflict, thus raising the questioning about this legislation. 
Indeed, discussions on the limits of the military penal code are 
not restricted to Brazil. As for the degree of military jurisdiction over 
civilians, nations are divided into four categories:
a) countries where military courts have jurisdiction only during 
the war period (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway 
and Sweden): b) countries where military courts have jurisdic-
tion both in time of war and in time of peace, but cannot judge 
civilians (England and the United States); c) countries permitting 
civilians to be tried by military courts, but only in case of crimes 
against the external security of the country or the Armed Forces 
63 Idem.
64 ANISTIA INTERNACIONAL. Assine agora a Ação Urgente VETA TEMER: 
crimes contra a vida devem ser julgados na justiça comum e impeça mais esse 
retrocesso! 
65 LEON, Lucas Pordeus. Comandante do Exército critica uso das Forças Arma-
das para garantia da lei e da ordem. Radio Agência Nacional. 
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(France, Italy, Argentina, and Uruguay), or during a state of siege 
(Colombia), or for terrorism crimes (Peru): d) countries that adopt 
a broad military jurisdiction over civilians in peacetime (Franco’s 
Spain, Pinochet’s Chile, Marcos’s Philippines during martial law of 
1974-81, and Brazil, even after the “Citizen” Constitution of 198866.
As Military Justice Jurisdiction varies with each country, the 
related cases occupied about 11% of the total number of crime cases 
reaching the International Court of Human Rights. Overall, the Court 
recognizes that there are still some challenges to be overcome by the 
Military Justice to ensure the human rights. These include the right to a 
due process, an effective judicial protection, and the duty to investigate 
and prosecute those responsible for human rights violations67. 
In seeking standards that limit the military justice action inter-
nationally, it must be deemed a restrictive military jurisdiction scope, 
besides special or exceptional, excluding civilian trials and those of 
military personnel directly involved in minor crimes, directly related 
to the military order68. Zaverucha and Melo Filho69 considered that only 
countries that strictly follow these precepts would be democratic, being 
unjustifiable the exceptions found in the Brazilian Military Justice Code. 
A more detailed analysis on international jurisprudence was 
reported in a very complete paper by Rabelo Neto70, who investigated 
31 cases tried between 1999 and 2015, by the Inter-American Court of 
66 ZAVERUCHA, Jorge. Military Justice in the State of Pernambuco after the 
Brazilian Military Regime: An Authoritarian Legacy. Latin American Resear-
ch Review. Vol. 34, No. 2, 1999. p.43-44.
67 MAG-GREGOR, Eduardo Ferrer. Las siete principales líneas jurisprudencia-
les de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos aplicable a la justicia 
penal. Revista IIDH. Vol. 59, 2014. passim. 
68 Ibdem, p. 80.
69 ZAVERUCHA, Jorge. e MELO FILHO, Hugo. Justiça Militar. In: AVRITZER, 
Leonardo; BIGNOTTO, Newton; GUIMARÃES, Juarez; FILGUEIRAS, Fer-
nando e STARLING, Heloisa. Dimensões Políticas da Justiça. Ed. Civilização 
Brasileira. p. 421-430, 2017.
70 RABELO NETO, Luiz Octávio. Competência da justiça militar da união para 
julgamento de civis: compatibilidade constitucional e com o sistema intera-
mericano de proteção de direitos humanos. Revista de Doutrina e Jurispru-
dência do Superior Tribunal Militar. V.25, n.2, 201. 2016. p. 119. 
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Human Rights (ICHR). According to this author, the ICHR considered 
the Military Court unable to judge civilian cases in 27 out of those, once it 
would infringe the legally binding principle of natural justice. Hence, the 
process would be rigged from the beginning and, thus, the ICHR avoided 
mentioning the defendant. In one of these cases, the ICHR considered 
the Military Justice partially and without independence.
With respect to jurisprudence, the author, specifically regarding 
the Brazilian Military Justice, does not rule out the possibility of the 
Military Justice judging civilians. However, he points out that, for an in-
dependent and impartial jurisdiction, in these cases, the military officers 
that are members of the Justice Council should not take part in trials71.
conclusIon
Discussions on the use of the Armed Forces in public security 
should not be restricted to issues of “on the edge” of the public security 
system, that is, the ostensive ways of solving conflicts in peacetime, when 
in direct contact with civil society. In fact, such discussions should en-
compass military action throughout criminal prosecution. Thus, it should 
be analyzed the employment of the Judicial Police, the Military Public 
Ministry, and, above all, the Military Justice of the Union and of the States, 
in jurisdictionally on cases involving civilians and military officers who 
practice crimes that would not fit, in principle, among those who face 
administration and military hierarchy and discipline.
If these limits are not observed, the use of the Armed Forces is 
likely to violate human rights, hence, overcoming the defenses of demo-
cratic ideology. Thus, by further expanding the interpretation of what is 
considered a military crime, with an enlarged military courts jurisdiction 
over civilians, Brazil runs to enter in a dangerous exception state. In addi-
tion, applying the military personnel recurrently in LAO actions to solve 
the public security irregularities in federation units, despite recognizing 
vulnerable States, jeopardize the federative pact.
71 RABELO NETO, Luiz Octávio. Competência da justiça militar da união para 
julgamento de civis: compatibilidade constitucional e com o sistema intera-
mericano de proteção de direitos humanos. Revista de Doutrina e Jurispru-
dência do Superior Tribunal Militar. V.25, n.2, 201. 2016. p. 135. 
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